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ABSTRACT 
 
   What exactly is a genetic disease?  For a phrase one hears on a daily basis, there has 
been surprisingly little analysis of the underlying concept.  Medical doctors seem 
perfectly willing to admit that the etiology of disease is typically complex, with a great 
many factors interacting to bring about a given condition.  On such a view, descriptions 
of diseases like cancer as genetic seem at best highly simplistic, and at worst 
philosophically indefensible.  On the other hand, there is clearly some practical value to 
be had by classifying diseases according to their predominant cause when this can be 
accomplished in a theoretically satisfactory manner.  The question therefore becomes 
exactly how one should go about selecting a single causal factor among many to explain 
the presence of disease.  When an attempt to defend such causal selection is made at all, 
the standard accounts offered (Koch’s postulates, Hill’s epidemiological criteria, 
manipulability) are all clearly inadequate.  I propose, however, an epidemiological 
account of disease causation which walks the fine line between practical applicability and 
theoretical considerations of causal complexity and attempts to compromise between 
patient-centered and population-centered concepts of disease.  The epidemiological 
account is the most basic framework consistent with our strongly held intuitions about the 
causal classification of disease, yet it avoids the difficulties encountered by its 
competitors. 
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I. Casual Selection and Causal Pessimism 
 
“For every complex problem, there is a simple, easy to understand, incorrect answer.” 
- Albert Szent-Gyorgyi 
 
   There is a crucial distinction that must be drawn between two related problems in 
causal analysis.  Germond Hesslow (1983, 1984, 1988) does this admirably well in his 
discussion of causal connection vs. causal selection.  The problem of causal connection is 
the problem of determining which factors in a complex set, many of which may be 
correlated to the outcome, are actually causes of the outcome.  It is this question that 
takes up the bulk of the scientist’s attention, and for obvious reasons.  For example, the 
current debate over whether one’s intake of dietary salt increases the risks of coronary 
disease is a debate about whether and to what extent salt is actually a causal factor (as 
opposed to merely a correlationally attractive bystander) in the disease etiology. 
   Casual selection is a fundamentally different problem, however.  Causal selection 
involves identifying which factor(s), among those known to be causally involved in a 
particular outcome, to cite as explaining that outcome.   In complex causal situations 
(which are particularly common in medicine), we simply can not, for practical reasons, 
cite the entire causal matrix as the appropriate explanationi.  For example, we would tend 
to cite the application of a burning match to a pile of hay as the cause of a barn fire, 
without meaning to imply that other factors (presence of oxygen, absence of large 
quantities of water, etc.) were not also causally involvedii.  Causal factors other than the 
one selected (presence of oxygen, etc.) are typically referred to as causal conditions (or, 
derogatorily, as mere conditions). 
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   Most human diseases have a highly complex etiology, involving as they do causal 
factors at all levels: genetic, physiological, systemic, psychological, social, etc.  It is thus 
understandable that, as long as questions of causal connection remain unanswered, 
considerable effort is expended in an attempt to further elucidate the causal matrix.  What 
we must keep firmly in mind, however, is that describing a disease simply in terms of its 
etiology is answering a fundamentally different question than that of causal selection.  
This becomes clear once we realize that, even if all causal connection problems were 
answered once and for all, causal selection problems would remain.  This is because what 
we regard as an appropriate explanation has a pragmatic component that is not captured 
in causal connection analysis.   
   Allow me to illustrate this point with a hypothetical example.  Suppose an alien 
physician were to examine a human hospital patient.  Suppose further that the alien’s 
technology is so advanced that he is able to determine the precise causal sequence leading 
to that particular patient’s cancer.  The alien has thus completely solved the causal 
connection problem and could, at least in principle, draw a causal map of the 
development of cancer accurate down to the subatomic level.  If you were to ask the 
alien, “What caused the cancer?” he might simply point to the causal diagram.  However, 
this is unlikely to satisfy us because we are not asking for an exhaustive list of causal 
connections, but for some selection as to which of those factors we should cite as being 
most explanatory.   
   The alien might be able to satisfy this desire for explanation if some causal factor were 
either necessary or sufficient for the development of the cancer.  For example, if 
everyone with a particular gene developed this cancer, the gene would be an obvious 
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choice for causal selection and we could legitimately call this a genetic disease in that 
sense.  We could also select in a relatively straightforward fashion if nobody without 
some (non-universal) environmental influence developed the cancer.  For example, if 
nobody developed the cancer unless they drank large amounts of cranberry juice – in 
which case, we might label it an environmental disease.  However, there are two basic 
problems here.  First, note that the examples above require information about populations 
of humans.  It would not be possible for the alien physician to judge the necessity or 
sufficiency of the causal factors present in this isolated case without knowing a great deal 
more about humans than he could reasonably derive from a single patient.  Second, given 
what we know about diseases like cancer, it seems highly unlikely that there will be such 
a neat identification of sufficient and/or necessary conditions, since the causal matrices 
are just too complex. 
   The two philosophers to think most clearly about this problem were J.S. Mill and J.L. 
Mackie, both of whom ultimately expressed pessimism about the possibility of non-
arbitrary causal selection.  Mill (1859) points out that, rather than simple necessary or 
sufficient conditions, what one typically finds are sets of conditions, the components of 
which are sufficient only when considered jointly, with the set itself being non-
necessaryiii.  For example, the fire in the barn is the result of a great many factors such as 
the application of burning match to hay, absence of water, presence of oxygen, etc. – 
none of which would bring about a fire by themselves (i.e., they are individually 
insufficient).  On the other hand, there are an infinite number of such sets which could 
bring about a fire in the barn – we might apply white phosphorous to the wall or suddenly 
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increase the air pressure 100,000,000 fold, for example.  Therefore, the particular set of 
factors in any case, while (jointly) sufficient, is not necessary.   
    Mill sympathizes with the desire to causally select one factor over another in such 
situations, but feels such exercises are ultimately arbitrary: 
“The real cause is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically  
speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them exclusively of the  
others…Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the  
distinction between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the  
capricious manner in which we choose to denominate the cause.” (Mill 1859, pp  
214-215) 
   Given that most diseases are causally complex, this problem is inescapable when 
classifying diseases in terms of their etiology, as modern medicine so often doesiv.  The 
fact of the matter is that much of importance hinges on the causal classification of a 
disease: social acceptability, funding for research, etc.  If such classifications really are 
fundamentally arbitrary, then we have much to correct. 
 
II. Simplistic Methods of Causal Selection 
“He who would do away with philosophy is the slave of the worst philosophy.” 
- Fredrich Engels 
 
   Ultimately, some of what we mean to capture by classifying diseases as genetic can be 
salvaged.  However, people tend to think about causal selection, when they think about it 
at all, in highly simplistic termsv.  In particular, there are three popular approaches which 
are used in an attempt to settle the causal selection problem in this context, all of which 
are inadequate. 
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   Perhaps the most common, but also certainly the most hopelessly flawed of these 
techniques, holds that we are justified in claiming a disease is genetic, provided that 
genes are causally involved.  This might be a defensible claim, as we will see, if the 
analysis went further than this to discuss what kind involvement there is and why it is the 
most important aspect of the explanation of the disease.  However, the typical conclusion 
of a medical genetics paper does not even begin to consider such things.  The recent 
literature is thus rife with examples of researchers claiming that, because there is good 
evidence of genetic involvement, the disease is now known to be geneticvi.  Little more 
needs to be said to show the absurdity of this than to point out that any disease 
whatsoever can be classified as genetic on these grounds.  All disease must involve, 
directly or indirectly, genes – if nothing else, genes code for the proteins which make all 
of biology possible.  Even something so obviously non-genetic as lead poisoning, for 
example, could be called genetic in the sense that some people are likely to have more 
efficient (gene-based) mechanisms for handling high lead levels and thus will tend not to 
get the condition when others around them do, etc.   We could, with equal justification, 
argue that all such disease should be classified as protein based, since all disease must 
also involve proteins.  Clearly, this kind of analysis does nothing to illuminate the causal 
situation. 
   The second approach was first systematically developed by Robert Koch in his set of 
three key postulates.  Since these postulates have done much to shape the current thinking 
about medical causation, they warrant close examination.  Koch argues that we are 
justified in saying a particular pathogen causes a particular disease whenever three basic 
conditions are met: 
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 1) The pathogen is always found in individuals with the disease. 
 2) The pathogen is never found in individuals with conditions other than the  
disease. 
  
3) The pathogen always produces the disease when introduced into healthy  
individuals. 
 
Note that postulate #1 is simply a requirement that the pathogen is necessary, while 
postulates #2 and #3 are requirements that it also be sufficientvii.  It is certainly true that 
these postulates served Koch and others well in the early field work for which they 
became famous.  The pathogenic diseases Koch studied are probably uniquely suited to 
this type of analysis, involving as they do a clearly identifiable infectious agent with  
well-defined and dramatic onset of a stereotypical set of symptoms.  But even for 
infectious diseases, these postulates are, strictly speaking, too strong.  For example, many 
people are infected with the TB bacillus yet never exhibit the disease, but we do not 
conclude that TB is not caused by the bacillusviii.   In any event, infectious diseases are 
not representative of disease in general and genetic disease in particular.    
   Consider the case of Cystic Fibrosis, often put forward as a classic example of a genetic 
disease.  As the story is typically told, Cystic Fibrosis is caused by any of several hundred 
known mutations in the Cystic Fibrosis Transmembrane Receptor (CFTR).  Given this 
account, one might reasonably expect that having a CFTR mutation will lead to CF and, 
conversely, that lacking a CFTR mutation prevents CF.  As often happens in such cases, 
however, the actual clinical picture that emerges is much more complex: 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
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    If we apply Koch’s postulates to the case of CF, we see the following pattern: 
 1) Is the genetic anomaly always found in individuals with the disease?    NO 
 2) Is the genetic anomaly never found in individuals with other conditions?   NO 
 3) Does the genetic anomaly always produce the disease in otherwise healthy  
    individuals?    NO 
 
According to Koch, therefore, there is no reason to describe CF as a genetic disease – 
despite the fact that we have a relatively good idea of its etiology and have excellent 
reason to believe that a gene is a crucial causal player.   
   There are also epidemiological criteria which are essentially more complex versions of 
Koch’s postulates.  Sir Austin Hill’s analysis lists eight different criteria which should be 
considered: 
 
1) Strength:  The correlation between the causal factor and the disease should be 
strong. 
 
2) Consistency: The correlation between causal factor and disease should be 
observed under varying conditions/individuals. 
 
3) Specificity:  The causal factor should be correlated only, or most strongly, with 
the disease. 
 
4) Temporality: The causal factor should precede the disease in temporal sequence. 
 
5) Biological gradient: The disease should exhibit a dose response curve for the 
causal factor. 
 
6) Plausibility: There should be a plausible causal story as to how the factor causes 
the disease. 
 
7) Coherence: The causal story about the factor and disease must cohere with other 
knowledge we have about other causal factors, etc. 
 
8)  Analogy: Similar causal factors should cause similar diseases. 
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This is undeniably an improvement over Koch’s original formulation, since it allows 
for a much more nuanced description of the causal relationship between a particular 
factor and the disease.  However, this is also something of a drawback:  where Koch’s 
postulates will usually yield a clear (if sometimes misleading) answer, Hill’s criteria will 
often not yield much of an answer at all (though they will not as frequently mislead).  For 
example, Hill provides no clear method of ranking or weighting the various factors.  
Thus, it is relatively mysterious what we are to make of a putative causal agent which 
scores well on one criterion and poorly on another.  When we examine the suitability of a 
genetic explanation for CF, we get something like the following pattern: 
1) Strength     Unknownix 
 
2) Consistency     No 
 
3) Specificity:       No 
 
4) Temporality:      Yes 
 
5) Biological gradient    Possibly 
 
6) Plausibility     Yes 
 
7) Coherence     Yes 
  
8)  Analogy:      Unknown 
   With three fairly positive indicators, two negative and three uncertain, perhaps one 
could make a better case on Hill’s criteria than on Koch’s postulates that CF is actually a 
genetic disease.  Hill’s account remains disturbingly vague, however. 
 
III. Manipulability 
 “A little inaccuracy saves a world of explanation.”    - C.E. Ayers 
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   There are actually a wide variety of techniques that have been developed to make sense 
of causal selectionx.  However, the one most pertinent by far to the question of genetic 
disease is manipulability.  The manipulability criterion says that a disease is genetic if 
and only if it is best controlled (prevented) through manipulation of the genes.  This has 
an obvious appeal for medicine - since the physician’s primary interest is in preventing 
disease, he is likely to advocate (at least implicitly) a manipulability criterion.  The basic 
problem here is that the intuitive appeal of manipulability, like that of Hill’s criteria, has 
been purchased at the price of clarity.    
   There are two main sorts of ambiguity here.  The first concerns how we are to interpret 
the phrase “best controlled”.  That is, what exactly makes one form of manipulation 
better than another?  Perhaps if one technique is cheaper, less invasive, more permanent, 
and easier to employ, this will not be a difficult decision.  However, how often will the 
choice actually be this clear?  It seems at least plausible, perhaps likely, that within 50 
years we will have developed the technology to alter the somatic genes of CF patients 
and restore them to something like normal health.  However, this treatment is likely to be 
expensive and may carry significant risks.  Would the gene therapy be a better 
manipulation than second generation DNase inhalers, a cheap and effective (if 
impermanent) treatment?  This seems like the kind of decision we would want to let the 
patient make himself, based on his own personal preferences.   Our instincts lead us in 
this direction precisely because it is very unclear how to decide which treatment is in fact 
best, or even if there is an objective best.  If we leave the decision to each patient while 
maintaining the manipulability criterion, however, CF becomes a genetic disease for 
patients who prefer the gene therapy and a non-genetic disease for those preferring the 
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inhaler.  This seems a very odd sort of relativity to introduce into our causal classification 
of a disease. 
    The second point of ambiguity concerns what kind of manipulability we have in mind.  
When people speak of manipulability, they are rarely clear as to whether they mean 
manipulability in practice or manipulability in principle.  Either way, there are 
difficulties.  Suppose we mean manipulability in practice – a disease is genetic if there 
are or very soon will be effective genetic interventions for individuals with the disease.  
We would all like to believe that such treatments are just around the corner, but is there 
really any compelling evidence to this effect?  To date, no somatic gene therapy has been 
successfully vetted in a clinical trialxi.  Moreover, there are several serious technical 
difficulties that will have to be resolved before the treatment becomes the standard of 
care (e.g., targeting all and only the desired cells, etc.).  Of course, we might be willing to 
endorse selective breeding or genetic engineering, where permanent alterations are made 
to the germ line of the population.  This would be more tractable from a purely technical 
point of view (we have bred agricultural organisms for thousands of years), but these 
techniques still are not really practical  because they have been rejected by all virtually 
all modern countries for compelling ethical reasons.  In such a case, the cure literally 
seems worse than the disease.  At the moment, therefore, there are very poor grounds for 
describing any disease as genetic on the basis of it manipulability in practice.  If what we 
mean by a genetic disease is that it is genetically manipulable in practice, then we will 
have to refrain from describing any diseases as genetic for a long time to come. 
    Perhaps what we really mean then is manipulability in principle – the question is thus 
not whether a genetic intervention is feasible now or in the near future, but whether one is 
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possible on some sort of theoretical grounds.  One difficulty that arises immediately is 
this: what theoretical grounds are we talking about?  Since manipulability in practice is 
something we do not currently have the technology to pull off, the theoretical grounds for 
a claim of manipulability in practice will have to be very general and vague.  I would be 
willing to admit that, given sufficiently advanced technology, any disease is in principle 
subject to genetic manipulation.  Our hypothetical alien physician, for example, would 
certainly be able to treat the human cancer patient via genetic intervention, should he 
choose to do so. 
   Notice what happens when we make this move, however.  First, we are now talking 
about science fiction, which destroys the original reason physicians favor manipulability: 
its emphasis on the practical aspects of patient care.  Second, with a completely 
unqualified notion of technological progress, we again run the risk of classifying all 
disease as genetic.  One does hear this claim occasionally from medical researchers,  but 
if all disease is genetic, then the description of a disease as genetic is trivially true.  We 
could, with equal depth of insight, note that all disease is protein-based.   
   Finally, even if we are willing to take a very optimistic view of technology and discuss 
manipulability only in principle, then any given disease could just as easily be described 
as environmental - the alien physician is also certain to be able to intervene in the 
patient’s cancer by using environmental rather than genetic factors.  In fact, it is quite 
common for putatively genetic diseases to be more amenable to environmental 
manipulation.  Thus, phenylketonuria (PKU) is genetic in principle – it is associated with 
a defective gene that may one day be repairable.  However, there are already dietary 
interventions that can prevent or mitigate the symptoms and there will likely be more 
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effective and less intrusive treatments developed along these lines in the future (perhaps a 
pill containing the missing enzyme so that patients could again ingest phenylalanine, 
etc.).  I grant that this may seem a bit far fetched at the moment, but that is precisely the 
point. 
   Manipulability in practice seems to involve either extremely dubious levels of genetic 
optimism or a willingness to engage in dangerous and far reaching social 
experimentation.  Manipulability in principle seems nothing more than a license to dream 
about what may come along at some point in the future and is so vague as to produce 
analyses that are both trivial and non-exclusive.  In either case, the original motivation for 
the manipulability criterion – that it meets the clinical concerns of the physician in a 
practical fashion – disappears altogether. 
 
IV. The Epidemiological Account 
“Metaphysics is nothing more than an extremely obstinate effort to think clearly.”  
– William James 
 
   There must be a way to satisfy both our practical need for disease classification and our 
theoretical need to do justice to the complexities of causal systems in biology.  There 
must be a causal analysis which captures both the practically-minded focus on individual 
patients and the necessary elements of population thinking.   The proper system would be 
as clearly decidable as Koch’s postulates, but allow for the kind of causal complexity 
incorporated in Hill’s criteria.  This system will certainly not be able to classify all human 
disease, indeed it may fail to clearly classify most human disease, given the complex 
causal system the human body is.  However, such an account would still represent a solid 
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foundation on which to build.  The epidemiological account of disease is an attempt to 
meet this challenge. 
   In order to avoid as many difficulties as possible, I set myself a relatively modest goal: 
I want to provide an account of disease causation which is minimally adequate – I make 
no pretense that this account can not be greatly improved or even that different versions 
of it may not be appropriate for answering different kinds of questions.     I must also 
make it clear that my goal is primarily to present a normative account of how the phrase 
“genetic disease” should be used, rather than a descriptive account of how it is actually 
used.  To be sure, a careful description and categorization of the various uses would be an 
interesting project, but it is not mine at present.  Of course, there is a fine line here - I 
have no wish to develop a disease concept that is so far from common practice that 
nobody will ever use it.  On the other hand, I do not want to adopt uses of the term which 
are incompatible or theoretically indefensible. 
   My epidemiological account is thus designed to satisfy the two most basic and widely 
held intuitions about disease causation as simply as possible: 
1) If a disease is genetic, this must mean that those with the gene are more likely  
than not to develop the diseasexii.  We might call this the bottom-up or  
individual causal viewpoint. 
2) If a disease is genetic, this must mean that most cases of disease in the  
population are caused by the gene.  We might call this the top-down, or 
populational causal viewpoint. 
   These seem entirely unexceptionable intuitions that any adequate account of causal 
selection will have to incorporate.  How could a disease be said to be genetic if those with 
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the gene are not (in some sense) likely to develop the disease?  How could a disease be 
genetic if most people who are its victims do not have the gene in question?  I thus treat 
these intuitions as primitive and in need of no further support.   
   I call my account the epidemiological account because it draws its inspiration from the 
field of epidemiology.  Like epidemiology, it is an analysis of disease that crucially 
depends on statistical methods applied to populations rather than individuals.  It is unlike 
epidemiology, however, in one crucial particular:  while epidemiologists invest a great 
deal of their effort in finding causes to associate with disease (solving the causal 
connection problem), my concern is in the explanation of disease (solving the causal 
selection problem) on the assumption that we have already distinguished causes from 
conditionsxiii.  To be sure, answering the causal selection question depends crucially on 
accurate information concerning causal connection.  I do not want to appear to 
underestimate the complexity of this task, but the methods and problems of causal 
connection analysis have been and will continue to be discussed quite widely in the 
literature and thus are not the focus of this paper. 
      Epidemiology is an examination of the properties of populations and thus it is crucial 
at the outset to specify a well-defined population to which the analysis will applyxiv.  As 
we will see, extremely counterintuitive results will be produced if we are unclear or 
waffle concerning the population to which the analysis applies.  Once we have clearly 
delineated our population and drawn up our list of causal factors, there are a great many 
questions one might ask.  For our purposes, however, there are four which are most 
crucialxv: 
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1) The Global Question (for the entire population): What is the probability that those 
who have the gene will contract or have contracted the disease because of that 
gene? 
2) The Diagnostic Question (for someone with both the disease and the gene):  What 
is the probability that the disease was caused by the gene? 
3) The Testing Question (for someone with the disease): What is the probability that 
the disease was caused by the gene? 
4) The Prognosis Question (for someone who has the gene): What is the probability 
that this will cause the disease? 
   Let’s turn to a particular case to develop the analysis we will need to answer each of 
these questions.  Suppose we look carefully at a population of 10,000 people where 
12.5% (1250) have a particular disease and 10% (1000) have a gene thought to cause that 
disease because 80% (800) of those with the gene develop the disease.  We then gather 
the following data about the distribution of the disease and its associated gene: 
       
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
   Unfortunately, this table is not accurate enough to answer our questions precisely.  This 
is because some people who do not have the gene nevertheless develop the disease, due 
to the involvement of other causal factors.  Therefore, some of the people who have the 
gene will develop the disease, not because of the gene, but because of these other factors.  
Thus, we must distinguish between cases where people have the gene and it causes them 
to have the disease and those where people have the gene and develop the disease for 
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other reasons.  If we assume that the gene and these other factors act independently, then 
we can say that approximately the same percentage of gene carriers will develop the 
disease for other reasons as those in the general population without the gene but with the 
disease (450/9000 = 5%).  We can then move on to the more accurate Table 3: 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
   With this correction, we are now in a position to answer, for this population, the 
original four questions posed:   
 
1) The Global Question (for the entire population): What is the probability that those who 
have the gene will contract or have contracted the disease because of that gene?   
   This would simply be the number of individuals whose disease was caused by the gene 
divided by the size of the entire population (760/10,000 = 7.6%).  This would tell us how 
large a problem the gene is causing in the population and thus, by extension, what could 
potentially be fixed by genetic manipulation.  It does not really tell us anything 
interesting about whether the disease is genetic, however.  We certainly would not want 
to say, for example, that rare diseases can not be considered genetic (in fact, most 
paradigm examples of genetic disease are quite rare). 
 
2) The Diagnostic Question (for someone with both the disease and the gene): What is 
the probability that the disease was caused by the gene? 
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   This may be called the Simple Etiologic Fraction (SEF), which in this case would be 
the number of people whose disease was caused by the gene divided by the total number 
of people with the gene and the disease (760/800 = 95%).  This would tell us how likely 
it is that a particular patient with the gene will develop a disease because of those genes 
or, if he already has the disease (and the gene), how likely it is that the condition was 
caused by the genes.  It also indicates what percentage of the population with the gene 
might potentially be impacted by genetic manipulation to prevent disease.   
   It is tempting to view a high SEF (above 50%) as an indication that the disease is in fact 
genetic.  However, we are tempted not because of what SEF actually indicates as what 
we might think it indicates.  It does not really interest us to know that, in individuals with 
both the gene and the disease, the gene is or is not usually the causal factor responsible 
(which is what SEF actually reveals).  It would interest us to know that the gene is 
usually the causal factor amongst those with the disease in general, since this would 
allow us to discover whether the populational causal intuition was met.  But this is not 
what SEF tells us and we can not derive that information from SEF (for this we need to 
answer the testing question).  Simply put, SEF tells us nothing about the percentage of 
diseased individuals who owe their suffering to their genes.  To do that, it would have to 
incorporate information about individuals with the disease, but who lack the gene (which 
it does not).   
   Similarly, SEF tells us nothing at all about the likelihood of developing the disease, 
given the gene (and thus can not answer the prognosis question).  We need this 
information to decide if the individual causal intuition is met.  In order to do that, 
however, SEF would have to factor in information about people with the gene, but who 
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remain disease-free (which it does not).  Tempting as it might appear on first 
examination, SEF is pretty useless in answering the causal selection problem. 
 
3) The Testing Question (for someone with the disease): What is the probability the 
disease was caused by the gene? 
   This is asking for what epidemiologists call the Population Etiologic Fraction (PEF).  
In this case, it would be the number of individuals whose disease was caused by the 
genes, divided by the total number of diseased individuals (760/1250 = 61%).  This does 
seem to be getting at something important in our concept of disease intuition.  In 
particular, as long as the PEF > 50%, we know that most cases of disease in the 
population are in fact caused by the genes.  This is precisely the requirement of the 
populational causal intuition, so it seems we need a stipulation in our concept of genetic 
disease that the PEF > 50%.  We might be tempted to stop here and say that this is the 
only criterion for genetic status.  However, although a high PEF insures that the 
populational intuition is met, it does not assure us with respect to the individual intuition.  
Consider the following variation on our original case: 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
   Here, although it is quite true that most cases of disease in the population are caused by 
the genes (PEF > 50%), the gene does not cause most people to develop the disease.  This 
violates our individual causal intuition and thus PEF needs to be supplemented as a 
concept of genetic disease. 
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4) The Prognosis Question (for someone who has the gene): What is the probability that 
this will cause the disease? 
   Here we are asking for what epidemiologist call Attributable Risk (AR).  In original 
case from Table 3, we calculate AR by dividing the number of people whose disease was 
caused by the gene by the total number of people with the gene (760/1000 = 76%).  
Again, this does seem to be getting at something important in our concept of disease 
intuition.  As long as the AR > 50%, we know that the gene will cause most of its carriers 
to develop the disease.  This meets the requirement of the individual causal intuition, and 
thus we must also stipulate in out general account of disease that the AR > 50%.  Note, 
however, that just as a high PEF (answering the populational causal intuition) does not 
guarantee a high AR, so a high AR (answering the individual causal intuition) does not 
guarantee a high PEF.  Consider the following case: 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
   Here, although it is quite true that, in most cases, the disease genes cause the disease 
(AR > 50%), it is equally true that most cases of disease are not caused by the gene (PEF 
< 50%).  This violates our populational causal intuition and thus we can not use the AR 
criterion alone. 
   We can now get down to the business of applying the epidemiological concepts.  Given 
the epidemiological outlook, what exactly constitutes a genetic disease?  Clearly, it must 
involve both PEF and AR, on pain of giving up one of our original intuitions.  It remains 
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an open issue, however, how strongly these should be interpreted.  One obvious possible 
answer would be to say that a disease is genetic whenever it is “practically sufficient” 
within a given populationxvi: 
Practically Sufficient (PS):  A disease is genetic whenever the gene’s  
Attributable Risk AND Population Etiologic Fraction are both 100%xvii.  In plain 
English, this means that everyone with the gene has the disease because of that 
gene AND no one with the disease has the disease because of anything other than 
the gene.   
   This accords nicely with our intuitions that being a genetic disease has something 
important to do with sufficiency and necessity.  On the other hand, PS does not make the 
mistake of claiming that the genes are either sufficient or necessary in the strict sense.  
Since epidemiological analysis is relativized explicitly to some population of interest, it is 
entirely possible that what is practically sufficient in one population will not be in 
another.     Practical sufficiency is thus a modification of our ordinary notion of 
sufficiency to highly complex causal systems - it requires only that that the gene(s) be 
necessary components of each set of sufficient conditions which can occur in the 
population.  PS is thus a more workable empirical notion of causal necessity and 
sufficiency. 
   The main difficulty with PS is that, even though it is more practical and restricted than 
sufficiency and necessity in the strict sense, it is still too strong to apply to the vast 
majority of human diseases (this would likely be true even if we lowered the threshold 
value to 95%).  Its value for our purposes is thus mainly to anchor the endpoint of 
epidemiological concepts of disease – it represents as strong a notion of causation as it is 
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possible to generate using population-relative epidemiological analysis of complex causal 
systems.   
    However, the goal is to develop a minimal notion of genetic disease.  If we are to 
preserve our two intuitions, any epidemiological concept must include both PEF and AR.  
But what should the threshold value for each variable be?  Clearly, it would have to be at 
least 50%, as suggested by the use of the term “most” in our original intuitions.   
 Minimally Epidemiological (ME):  A disease is classified as genetic whenever  
both the Population Etiologic Fraction and the Attributable Risk exceed 50%. 
   If I refuse to sanction labeling a disease as genetic unless it has at least a 50% PEF and 
a 50% AR, then I have insured that my intuitions are met.  Most people with the disease 
will have the disease because they have the gene and most people with the gene will 
develop the disease because of the gene.  We could, of course, require that the thresholds 
be set higher than 50%.  While I have no principled objection to this, it will be difficult to 
defend any number other than 50% as anything other than arbitrary.  Moreover, it will be 
difficult enough to establish that current candidates for genetic disease status are 
legitimate in a minimal sense. 
 
V.  Applying the Epidemiological Concept 
“The more you know, the more you know you don't know.” 
                                                  -Aristotle  
   Let’s attempt to fix the endpoints of the epidemiological continuum as it appears in 
practice.  On one end of the continuum we have diseases like obesityxviii.  Obesity has 
increasingly been described as a genetic condition, since several genes have recently been 
 23 
A Disease by any other Name… 
 
discovered that regulate body weight, at least in mice.  In this case, we can safely say that 
genes are  1) causally involved,  2) in principle manipulable and  3) practically sufficient 
to induce obesity in certain populations of lab mice.  Even in the mouse populations, 
however, we do not have the data we would need to claim that the condition is genetic in 
the ME sense.  One reason for this, ironically, is that we do not know enough about 
healthy mice.  That is, we do not know the prevalence of the “obesity gene” among 
normal weight mice, and thus can not accurately calculate AR.  We also do not know 
how many diseased mice lack the obesity gene, and thus can not calculate PEF precisely 
eitherxix. 
   Of course, we could sample normal weight mice and diseased mice and at least estimate 
these values in some rough sense, likely with enough accuracy to pass judgment on the 
disease’s ME genetic status for populations of mice reared under “normal” protocols 
(e.g., with diet and exercise held constant).  However, in human populations, at least in 
the affluent West, it seems highly unlikely that PEF for genes with respect to obesity will 
exceed 50%.  Although it is certainly interesting to find that genes can induce obesity, 
these cases are only a small fraction of the causes of obesity.  Other factors like diet 
(which can not be controlled well in human populations, despite the best educational 
efforts of our medical community) will have extremely high PEF values.  Diet will 
therefore almost certainly be singled out as the explanatory factor, contra genes, by any 
reasonable causal selection scheme.  According to the epidemiological account, then, 
human obesity should not be classed as a genetic disease - genes do seem to play a role 
here, even an important role, but they are not the predominant cause of obesity. 
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   At the other extreme, a condition like Klinefelter’s syndrome seems defensibly 
geneticxx.  Klinefelter’s is caused by the presence of more than one copy of the X 
chromosome alongside a Y chromosome and results in numerous problems with the 
development of sexual characteristics.  Here, the genes seem Practically Sufficient (PS) 
for the trait (AR and PEF of 100%).  Again, of course, we will have difficulty supporting  
this claim as strongly as we would like, since we do not really know if the relative 
numbers of people with the genetic anomaly who fail to exhibit the condition or who 
exhibit the condition for reasons other than their genes.  However, in the case of entire 
additional chromosomes and complex symptomologies, we have very sound theoretical 
grounds to expect that very few people indeed will fall in these categories.  At the very 
least, it seems an excellent bet that Klinefelter’s syndrome will qualify as genetic in the 
ME sense, and most likely in the PS sense as well. 
   Cystic fibrosis (CF) is a much more complex case.  CF is associated with any of at least 
300 different known mutations in the Cystic Fibrosis Transmembrane Conductance 
Regulator (CFTR) gene.  There is no clear relationship between the severity of symptoms 
and specific mutations, and there are even cases where individuals with a CFTR mutation 
do not have the disease(see Table 1).  CF thus could not be classified as genetic in the PS 
sense.  Even on the ME account, the case is not perfectly clear.  The PEF for the genes 
(collectively, though not for any single mutation) is probably at or close to 100% - we 
have, at least arguably, decent data here since it is not unusual for CF sufferers to be 
tested for the gene.  Again, however, the AR is simply not known, though we do know it 
is definitely < 100%, since we know of individuals with the mutations who exhibit no 
symptoms of the disease.  This certainly should counsel caution in describing CF as 
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genetic even in the ME sense.  However, I would argue that it still seems a good bet 
(though not an excellent one), given the fundamental function of the CFTR receptor in 
the cell, that individuals with the mutations who manage to function normally are 
relatively rare (and thus that AR is fairly high).  But they need not be terribly rare - unless 
these lucky individuals actually outnumber those with the gene and the disease, CF will 
still qualify as genetic in the ME sense (AR > 50%).   
 
VI. Relativity Considerations 
“I am sorry that I have had to leave so many problems unsolved. I always have to 
make this apology, but the world really is rather puzzling and I cannot help it.” 
- Bertrand Russell  
 
   The epidemiological account is able to handle the complex and highly variable causal 
systems we know to be operating in human disease, while also restricting itself  to 
questions of a decidable empirical nature.  However, this advantageous arrangement does 
come at a price – as an inherently statistical account, any epidemiological explanation of 
a disease must be explicitly relativized to some particular population.  There is no 
guarantee that the explanation for a trait in one population will hold true for other 
populations – indeed, there is often excellent reason to think that it will notxxi. 
   The population relativity of epidemiological explanations leads to a number of potential 
worries.  For one thing, it is not clear precisely how one is to choose the population in 
question.  There can be no answer to this other than a pragmatic one - the population 
chosen must be one of sufficient interest to one’s audience.   It is true that sometimes this 
will result in a great many competing explanations for the same trait.  While this is 
certainly imperfect, it is clearly preferable to the alternative of a misleading uniformity.   
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   In any event, it is also true that we very often will have a clearly defined population in 
mind when we create an explanation.  The United States Department of Health, for 
example, is primarily concerned with the explanation of diseases within the U.S. 
population.  Those still worried about relativism creeping into our explanations can take 
solace from the fact that the population in question must at least be cited explicitly and 
the rules for what counts as adequate within any population are well-defined.  The 
epidemiological account, therefore, hardly constitutes an “anything goes” abandonment 
of objectivity. 
   It also might plausibly be objected that such an account of explanation is completely at 
a loss when faced with the task of explaining individual occurrences of a traitxxii.   For 
example, if a patient insists on knowing what caused his particular case of cancer, it does 
not help him very much to cite the relative prevalence of causal factors within the larger 
population of which he is a part.   This is indeed counter-intuitive, especially given the 
focus of modern medicine on the care of individual patients.  However, before taking this 
criticism too far, we should consider whether or not there really is an alternative.   
   Recall the case of our causally omniscient alien physician: he knows everything there is 
to know about the particular patient’s case, but nothing about the more general 
population.  If he really wanted to answer the patient’s question about his particular case 
(other than by simply indicating the entire causal matrix), he would have only two 
possible routes.  First, he could engage in so-called counterfactual analysis, where one 
tries to make projections about what would have happened in a particular case were the 
circumstances different from what they actually are.  This can become tortuous indeed – 
as when modal logicians speak of an infinite series of possible worlds, similar in some 
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but not all respects to our own, in an attempt to make sense of the semantics here.  For 
example, we might well wonder what life would be like in a possible world where Hitler 
postponed the invasion of Soviet Russia until after the fall of Britain.  When it comes to 
causal analysis of disease in individual cases without any information from populations, 
it is hard to see how this is more than raw speculation of a particularly fanciful kind.   
   The only other option left to the alien doctor would be to explicitly import populational 
data.  In a population, but not in an individual, there will be variation in causal factors.  In 
a large enough population, one can find almost any combination of relevant casual (risk) 
factors.  By crunching these numbers, we can calculate the actual risk of a particular 
disease, given any set of initial conditions.  In other words, populational data would allow 
us to solve the problem - but only by cheating.  We simply can not say much, if anything, 
about the relative importance of causal factors if we rely only on the perspective of the 
individual patient – the causal selection problem requires data from populations for its 
resolution.  To suggest, therefore, that reliance on populations is somehow a difficulty is 
to imply endorsement of an impossible alternative.  Without some, at least implicit, 
appeal to population-level information such as which factors vary and in what way, there 
are simply no grounds for causal selection, no matter what account one favors.   
   Thus, an account of causal selection which can explain individual cases is, strictly 
speaking, impossible.   Accounts other than the epidemiological one still use populational 
information because they must, but they sneak it in the back door without ever being 
clear about what they are doing.  The result is a fuzzy and misleading analysis of the 
problem.  Seen in this light, the epidemiological requirement that the explanation be 
relativized explicitly to a carefully delimited population is a virtue, not a vice. 
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
   The concept of a genetic disease is neither well-developed nor generally defensible as it 
is employed in the literature.   There are very few attempts to make the criteria for causal 
selection explicit in general, and almost none in the specific case of human disease.  One 
must reason backwards from the kinds of claims one finds in the literature to implicit 
notions of causal selection, but the notions thus uncovered are not able to withstand the 
harsh light of critical scrutiny.  Rather, they owe their survival to their very ambiguity.   
   The epidemiological account of genetic traits is an analysis of genetic disease which is 
both practical and theoretically defensible.  This account avoids many of the criticisms 
leveled against its rivals, while still preserving a use of “genetic trait” which is useful and 
informative.  However, we must apply it with great care.  In particular, we must always 
keep in mind that a great many traits, likely even a large majority, will not meet any 
defensible criterion of genetic status.  This is not a failure of the epidemiological account, 
so much as an admission that the world of biological causation is far too complex and 
varied to admit of simplistic categorization. 
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TABLE 1:  PERMUTATIONS OF DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA  
AND DISEASE IN CYSTIC FIBROSIS 
CLASSIC 
SYMPTOMS 
SWEAT 
TEST 
GENETIC 
TEST 
FREQUENCY 
positive positive positive classic CF 
positive positive negative occurs 
positive negative positive common 
positive negative negative common 
negative positive positive occurs 
negative positive negative occurs 
negative negative positive unknown 
negative negative negative health 
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Table 2 
 DISEASE NO DISEASE TOTAL 
DISEASE GENE 800 200 1000 
NO DISEASE GENE 450 8550 9000 
TOTAL 1250 8750 10000 
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Table 3 
 DISEASE NO DISEASE TOTAL 
Gene present, causes 
disease 
760 0 760 
Gene present, but not 
cause of disease 
40 200 240 
NO DISEASE GENE 450 8,550 9,000 
TOTAL 1,250 8,750 10,000 
 
Simple Etiologic Fraction = 760/800 = 95% 
Population Etiologic Fraction = 760/1,250 = 61% 
Attributable Risk 760/1,000 = 76% 
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   Table 4 
 DISEASE NO DISEASE TOTAL 
Gene present, causes 
disease 
1,000 0 1,000 
Gene present, but not 
cause of disease 
100 1,050 1,150 
NO DISEASE GENE 700 7,150 7,850 
TOTAL 1,800 8,200 10,000 
 
Simple Etiologic Fraction =  1,000/1,100 = 91% 
Population Etiologic Fraction =  1,000/1,800 = 56% 
Attributable Risk = 1,000/2,150 = 47% 
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Table 5 
 DISEASE NO DISEASE TOTAL 
Gene present, causes 
disease 
710 0 710 
Gene present, but not 
cause of disease 
90 200 290 
NO DISEASE GENE 2,000 7,000 9,000 
TOTAL 2,800 7,200 10,000 
 
Simple Etiologic Fraction = 710/800 = 89% 
Population Etiologic Fraction = 710/2,800 = 25% 
Attributable Risk =  710/1,000 = 71% 
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i Indeed, one common complaint about the holistic approach to causal explanation is that 
it becomes very difficult to limit the number of causal factors one is forced to consider, 
and a kind of “galloping holism” threatens (Sterelney, et. al., 1996).  In the extreme, for 
example, one can make a case that all factors within the light cone of a particular 
outcome may have to be included in a truly complete causal explanation. 
ii I revert to well-characterized situations like barn fires when it is important to minimize 
the intuitive impact of our causal ignorance.  One could in principle construct the same 
sort of example with a disease, but our ignorance of the causal factors and their 
importance will tend to lead the discussion away from causal selection and towards 
causal connection issues. 
iii Mackie (1965, 1974) develops a precise vocabulary to discuss these relationships.  The 
application of fire to hay would be seen as an INUS factor:  an Insufficient but 
Unnecessary part of  a set of conditions which is Unnecessary but Sufficient for the 
effect.  A set of INUS factors, which is jointly sufficient to bring about an effect, is called 
a Minimally Sufficient Condition (MSC). 
iv Wulff (1984) offers an interesting discussion of the evolution of disease classification 
away from symptomology and towards causal agency.  It should be clear, however, that if 
we define a disease in terms of the presence of some particular causal factor, then we 
have already chosen a particular way to answer the causal selection question.  This may 
work very well for, say, infectious diseases.  However, the coming genetic revolution is 
likely to reveal major flaws in this approach as more and more asymptomatic people with 
“disease genes” are discovered. 
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v  To further complicate matters, questions of genetic disease are tied to misleading and 
inappropriate conceptions of the nature and significance of genes – though this is not 
often recognized (see Smith 1999). 
vi Even in those cases where the researchers are carefully circumspect, reporters covering 
their work typically are not. 
vii It may be a bit unfair to show Koch as requiring strict sufficiency and necessity 
through the use of “always” and “never” in the postulates.  Whatever the historical 
accuracy of this move, it serves to illustrate the poverty of such an approach when 
applied to complex diseases.  At a minimum, Koch’s approach would have to be 
supplemented with another technique (which he does not provide) on pain of leaving the 
causal selection to the whim of the researcher. 
viii Indeed, exposure to the TB bacillus used to be essentially universal before modern 
public health measures were instituted in the Western world.  Today, exposure to the 
bacillus tends to be identified as the cause of TB, but in the 1940’s it would be more 
accurate to identify differences in immunity rather than exposure as the culprit (Stern 
1973). 
ix We have to be very careful not to overestimate the strength of the correlation.  It is true 
that all individuals with Huntington’s Chorea, for example, also have the characteristic 
genetic anomaly.  It does not follow from this, however, that all individuals with the 
genetic anomaly have Huntington’s.  We simply do not know how many asymptomatic 
people have the gene in question.  What is more, we will not find out with typical testing 
procedures, which are directed only at those who are sick. 
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x These include abnormality analysis (Hart & Honore 1959, Hilton 1988), unexpected 
conditions (Gardenfors 1980, van Fraassen 1980), precipitating causes (Ducasse 1924, 
Ryle 1949), dispositional conditions (Nagel, 1961, Martin 1978), and instrumental 
efficacy (Collingwood 1938).  One of the most promising approaches is to develop a 
notion of limited or practical sufficiency (Gifford 1990, Wulff 1984b) which I attempt to 
incorporate in an explicit fashion in my own epidemiological account. 
xi Worse, there has been at least one unanticipated death which seems to have resulted 
from gene therapy. 
xii Actually, this is a bit more complex than it seems here, but I will discuss this in the 
specific cases later. 
xiii We must specify an explicit list of causal factors among which we will perform our 
selection.  Should it turn out later that we were unaware of some important causal factor, 
for example, we will have to redo the analysis.   
xiv In fact, the reference population must have at least two subpopulations differing in the 
trait in question.  This is because the phenomenon actually being explained is the 
variance in the trait between the two subpopulations, not the trait simplicitur.   
xv I am indebted to Henrik Wulff for much of the insight behind this categorization and 
for greatly improving the precision of the numerical analysis which supports them.   
xvi See also Gifford 1990 and Wulff 1984b for similar attempts to develop a notion of 
practical sufficiency. 
xvii Alternately, one might require both numbers to exceed some very high figure less than 
100%, say 95%, as we do when calculating statistical significance.  This would provide a 
very strong notion of genetic causation without ruling out every possible exception. 
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xviii Of course, it is an open question as to whether a condition like obesity should really 
qualify as a disease.  It is not my intent to offer a general account of disease, so I will 
simply assume for the purposes of argument here that it does. 
xix In fact, this sort of situation poses a major problem for any theoretically adequate 
notion of disease causation.  Studies to determine the actual incidence of disease genes in 
healthy populations will be extremely expensive and may not be available for many years 
to come. 
xx It has been suggested that perhaps Klinefelter’s is not a genetic disease at all, since it is 
not heritable.  People’s intuitions seem to differ widely on the importance of this point 
and, in any event, my purpose is to develop a normative account rather than a descriptive 
one.  Unless it can be shown that some particular environmental factor routinely accounts 
for the genetic changes, the epidemiological account will still describe the condition as 
genetic. 
xxi In fact, this will be quite common with some traits: lactose intolerance is a genetic trait 
for most populations in Western Europe and the U.S. (where consumption of milk 
products is common), yet it is clearly environmental in many Asian countries. See also 
Burian (1981-2) and Smith (1992) for a discussion of population-relativity in 
phenylketonuria, as well as Stern’s (1973) analysis of tuberculosis. 
 
xxii This is because there is no variation within an individual with respect to the causal 
factors to be analyzed.   
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